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Summary: Recent studies have suggested the existence of ‘election-year economics’ in 
fiscal policy in transition countries. This study asks whether such electoral cycles in 
aggregate measures (overall expenditures, revenues and balance) and spending 
composition (broad vs. targeted outlays) differ among countries with different political 
systems. This question is motivated by a sharp division between majoritarian-
presidential systems in Central Asia and Eastern Europe, and proportional-parliamentary 
systems in the Baltics, Central and Southeastern Europe. Further, in the absence of 
context-sensitive theories, the paper asks whether observed outcomes in the transition 
process conform to the theoretical priors developed for conditions in stable democracies. 
Finally, the paper attempts to normatively establish whether either of the alternative 
combinations yields more optimal policy outcomes. The results suggest that the 
differences indeed exist, primarily on the revenue side and in the composition of 
expenditures. These results differ markedly from those for stable democracies, especially 
in the case of composition of spending. Normatively, presidentialism yields suboptimal 
outcomes in comparison to parliamentarianism, likely due to inefficient system of 
constitutionally intended checks and balances.  
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1  INTRODUCTION 
Recent studies have suggested the existence of “election-year economics” in 
fiscal policy in transition countries.
1 Introduction of competitive elections has 
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1  The literature on political business cycles in transition is not voluminous.  Only a handful of 
papers take up the topic: Akhmedov and Zhuravskaya (2004) for Russian regions, Case (2001) for 
income redistribution policies in Albanian municipalities, Verstyuk (2004) for national and 
regional-level revenues and expenditures in Ukraine, Benecki, Hölscher and Jarmuzek (2006) for 
Poland, and Hallerberg, da Souza and Clark (2002) for Central and Eastern Europe EU accession 
countries.  Klasnja (2007) examines fiscal policy cycles in a panel of 25 countries and for a subset 
of countries with competitive elections. Marko Klašnja 
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brought about the incentives for policymakers to manipulate fiscal policy 
instruments in order to increase reelection prospects, much like the practice 
observed in developed countries (see for example Alesina and Roubini 1997).  
What shapes these incentives for electoral fiscal manipulation in 
transition countries? The political business cycle (PBC) literature has elaborated 
on the core reasons – opportunism, career concerns, partisan/ideological 
differences, “ego” rents (see for example Drazen 2000, Ch. 7 for review). 
Exigencies caused by the transition process may also be an important factor. 
Pervasive costs of reforms may have increased electoral pressures by dissatisfied 
voters, alleviation of which may be attempted through electoral policy 
manipulation. Transitional disequilibria induced pervasive rent-seeking and 
corruption, “disguising” of which from the voters may be tried through a 
populist electoral fiscal policy (Klasnja 2007).  
Several recent studies (Austin-Smith 2000, Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini 2000, Lizzeri and Persico 2001, Haggard and McCubbins 2001, 
Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno 2002, Persson and Tabellini 2003), 
however, have suggested another channel of influence, of a fundamentally 
political nature: fiscal outcomes may be structured by broad constitutional 
choices – and the resulting political institutions. Different electoral  rules 
generate different modes of translation of votes into electoral outcomes, yield 
different levels of sensitivity to changes in marginal votes and/or vote 
distribution, etc. Similarly, different forms of government allow more or less 
discretion to the executive; provide different levels of centralization of 
policymaking, collusion of interest, transparency and accountability, etc. All 
these factors – overlapping with or complementary to those above – will shape 
fiscal policy incentives, both long-term, and around elections.  
There is a sharp split in the distribution of constitutional arrangements 
across transition countries (see Table 1 in the Appendix). A combination of 
majoritarian election rules and presidential regimes is predominant in Eastern 
Europe and Central Asia, whereas proportional systems with parliamentary 
regimes are mostly found in Central and Southeastern Europe and the Baltics. 
This division makes the investigation into constitutional impacts on policy 
cycles in transition compelling, potentially uncovering not just positive but also 
normative policy tradeoffs stemming from constitutional choices. In other 
words, the questions are: i) whether there are systematic differences in fiscal 
policy around elections in transition countries with different electoral rules and 
forms of government, and ii) if any combination yields better policy outcomes 
than others.  Previous studies have addressed these questions, but not in the 
context of transition countries. This paper attempts to fill this gap.
2  
                                                 
2 There may be a problem of inference in this type of broad research question.  The non-random 
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Moreover, most studies in this orientation have focused on what is here 
termed the ‘stock’ of fiscal policy, namely, the persistent differences in fiscal 
outcomes across general constitutional groups. This is not surprising: neither 
constitutions nor preferences reflected in fiscal policy outcomes change 
frequently.
3  Still, only a handful of studies focused on the ‘flow’ itself – the 
differences in the behavior of fiscal policy around elections (Persson and 
Tabellini 2003, Saporiti and Streb 2003, Streb, Lema and Torrens 2005).
4 There 
may be strong reasons to expect that the factors influencing the longer-run fiscal 
policy outcomes will also be at work in shaping electoral cycles. Stock outcomes 
are, after all, a result of repeated instances of elections. Still, flow outcomes may 
not necessarily follow the stock ones in lockstep. This may particularly be true if 
these long-run factors – entrenched preferences and constitutional choices – 
themselves become a subject of change. The institutional impact may then be 
primarily observed in the flow outcomes, which will be shaping the (new) stocks 
that are “in the making”. 
Transition countries represent a case in point. Many of them have 
devised constitutional arrangements afresh following the break-up of the Soviet 
Union and Yugoslavia, and/or comprehensive regime change. Also, pre-
transition fiscal preferences and practices likely received significant reshaping 
amidst the changing economic system and the role of the state within it. The two 
combined thus yield a natural experiment of the “fresh-paint” impact of 
constitutional (re)designs on fiscal policymaking around elections. However, 
transition countries have not been included in the existing studies of flow 
outcomes (or stock outcomes, for that matter). This study tries to fill this gap as 
well. 
So, do transition countries conform to existing theoretical priors about 
(stock) impacts of constitutions in democracies on fiscal outcomes around 
elections? If not, where are the main points of divergence, suggesting what 
possible culprits? These are also questions motivating this study.   
                                                                                                                          
See for example Acemoglu (2005).  These problems should be less egregious in the case of ‘flow’ 
outcomes and following the transitional ‘turn-overs’, as explained in the following paragraphs.  
Also, the methodology used in the empirical section should be sufficient to address these issues.  
3 Another reason is that of statistical nature in conducting empirical verification: fundamental 
constitutional changes are rare, and so inference about constitutional effects on policy outcomes 
comes primarily from cross-country variation.  However, for estimating ‘flow’ effects, cross-
sectional techniques are a suboptimal choice.  Yet, panel estimates underutilize time-invariant 
phenomena, and so the results are indirect and less clearly related to the existing ‘stock’ theory.  
See Persson and Tabellini (2003) for discussion.  
4 Other studies, such as Alt and Lassen (2006), Shi and Svensson (2006), or Gonzales (2002), 
investigate the institutional determinants of observed political business cycles.  They focus, 
however, on what may rather be regarded as institutional consequences of primary constitutional 
arrangements inspected here. Marko Klašnja 
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The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 gives an overview of relevant 
theory and empirics informing the comprehensive empirical analysis in this 
paper. Priors about fiscal outcomes with regards to different electoral rules and 
forms of governments are discussed. Section 3 outlines the data, variables, and 
methodology. Section 4 surveys the empirical results, gauging them against 
theoretical underpinnings in Section 2. Section 5 offers concluding remarks and 
discussion for future research.  
 
 
2  THEORY 
 
2.1  Electoral Rules 
Generally, a distinction is made between majoritarian and proportional electoral 
systems, based on the features such as electoral formula, district magnitude, and 
ballot structure. Electoral formula represents a method in which votes are 
converted into legislative seats. Broadly, a differentiation is made between 
winner-takes-all (majority or plurality) rules and proportional representation 
(PR). District magnitude reflects the number of representatives elected by each 
constituency size. Smaller districts are typically associated with majoritarian 
systems, larger and often nation-wide districts are found in proportional systems. 
Ballot structure determines whether candidates are elected individually or on 
party lists. Individual ballots are normally used in small districts, and so are 
more often a characteristic of majoritarian electoral rules, and vice versa for 
proportional systems.  
Why and how do these rules structure fiscal outcomes? Intuitively, 
politicians do not need to take into account the preferences and interests of all 
voters, but need primarily to please the subset of voters to win the election. The 
electoral formula determines this minimal number of votes – and a minimal 
coalition of voters – needed. Under plurality or majority rules, the percentage of 
total vote needed is typically smaller than in proportional systems.
5 Politicians 
are thus induced to internalize benefits for smaller segments of the population in 
the provision of public goods and redistribution by means of fiscal outlays 
(Persson and Tabellini 2003). This has potential ramifications for both the size 
and the composition of the budget. By inducing politicians to focus more on 
swing voters, majoritarian systems generate greater electoral competition among 
voters for fiscal ‘attention’. This brings about lower overall provision of public 
goods (Persson and Tabellini 1999, Lizzeri and Persico 2001), and a greater 
preference/demand for geographically or functionally targeted over broad-based 
fiscal instruments, such as ‘pork-barrel’ spending (Drazen and Eslava 2004), ad 
                                                 
5 Under the plurality rule, a party can win with only 25% of the national vote: 50% of votes in 
50% of the districts.  Under full PR, the party needs 50% of the national vote.   Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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hoc government purchases, wages and local public goods (Milesi-Ferretti, 
Perotti and Rostagno 2002). Broad-based transfers and assistance programs, on 
the other hand, benefit larger groups of population and are thus preferred in 
proportional systems. Further, lower public goods provision and greater 
‘targetability’ and competition among voters affect their preferences about taxes. 
If the fiscal benefits accrue to powerful swing minorities, the majority of voters 
prefer lower levels of taxation, given its lower marginal utility. This should 
cause budgets to be smaller in majoritarian systems than in proportional systems, 
where the benefiting majority prefers higher taxes to finance greater public 
goods provision and redistribution in their favor (Austen-Smith 2000).  
  District magnitude has similar effects: larger districts give politicians 
strong incentives to seek support from broader coalitions in the population, 
motivating larger and broader fiscal programs. Smaller districts foster attention 
to pivotal geographical constituencies, inducing greater supply of particularistic 
benefits.  
  Ballot structure is argued to have an effect primarily through another 
channel of influence on fiscal incentives – attribution to and sensitivity of votes 
to incumbents’ performance.
6 Individual ballots create a more direct link to 
incumbents’ performance, and thus breed stronger incentives for attributable 
performance. Party-list system weakens individual incentives for good 
performance since it creates a free-rider problem, indirect chains of delegation, 
monitoring difficulties and more centralized mechanisms of rent-seeking 
(Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003, Kucinova and Rose-Ackerman 2005). This 
may cause more wasteful spending and consequent upward pressures on 
taxation. This, however, may be alleviated by allowing an open-list ballot, 
whereby voters choose the ordering of the list with which the party stands in the 
election.
7  
  In all, the ‘stock’ priors may be summarized as follows: majoritarian 
systems should be associated with smaller governments, less waste, lower 
provision of public goods, and budget composition tilted towards targeted 
instruments. The opposite goes for proportional systems. Some of these 
                                                 
6 The term accountability is deliberately avoided here, despite its common usage in the cited 
literature.  The main reason is the ambiguous theorized effect on the ‘stock’ vs. ‘flow’ outcomes, 
as is explained in the following paragraphs.  Another reason is the focus on transition countries.  
Strong democratic accountability is more a feature of mature democracies, and is less present in 
countries undergoing early transition from autocratic rule.   
7 Another aspect of importance – ignored here – is the party structure, that is, the number, size and 
orientation of parties in the political system.  It is, however, not exogenous to the electoral system.  
For example, majoritarian systems are more frequently associated with fewer parties and are more 
likely to produce single-party majority governments, whereas coalition and minority governments 
are more likely under proportional systems, which typically have a greater number of parties.  
Kontopoulos and Perotti (1999), for example, then show that coalition governments are more 
likely to have larger government spending due to common-pool problems in fiscal policy.   Marko Klašnja 
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predictions have been confirmed empirically for large cross-sections of 
democracies (see Persson and Tabellini 2003, and review therein). Table 2 gives 
a cursory and simple non-parametric overview for transition countries. One is 
certainly tempted to say that priors are generally upheld here as well.
8   
Normatively, this suggests that there is a tradeoff between two broad 
constitutional choices, neither of which may be delivering superior outcomes. 
Proportional systems are indeed more representative, but induce more waste, 
rent opportunities and redistribution in favor of the majority. Public good 
provision is achieved at the expense of the agency problem (Persson, Roland and 
Tabellini 1999, Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi 2003). Majoritarian systems 
under-provide benefits for broad groups and redistribute in favor of minorities, 
but create less waste and should hold policymakers more strongly accountable. 
What would be the predictions for the ‘flow’ outcomes, that is, for the 
periods immediately before and after elections? If stock priors are a guide, we 
should expect greater cycles in targeted programs in majoritarian, and in broad 
transfers in proportional systems. Also, we should perhaps expect taxes and 
revenues to be cut more strongly in majoritarian systems, to please the 
preference for lower taxation by the majority of voters. Finally, with respect to 
attribution and sensitivity, the priors are ambiguous: if incentives for attributable 
performance are stronger in majoritarian systems, they should display larger 
variations in spending and taxes around elections. On the other hand, if more 
difficult attribution and less sensitivity lead to more wasteful spending, 
proportional systems may exhibit greater cycles in spending and/or overall 
balance.  
Furthermore, an empirical question is whether any one channel dominates 
over the others, as well as whether their co-influence is consistent with their 
hypothesized individual impact. Finally, the question is whether the normative 
tradeoff (public good provision vs. agency problem) holds for the flow outcomes 
in transition countries.   
 
 
2.2  Forms of Government 
Comparative studies intuitively differentiate between two general constitutional 
arrangements with respect to the form of government – presidential-
                                                 
8 The temptation needs to be resisted, however.  The rest of Table 2 reveals that majoritarian and 
presidential countries in transition are less economically developed, have a worse record of 
economic reforms (judging by the average score on the EBRD Transition Indicators) and more 
closed economies, younger populations and a greater share of agriculture.  All of these influence 
the fiscal outcomes strongly, and might fully explain the observed differences with no causal 
effects left for the constitutions.  A more robust examination of these stock differences is beyond 
the scope of this study, though.   Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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congressional and parliamentary. Economic and political literature has generally 
focused on how these two categorized systems compare in two broad aspects: 
separation of powers, and the so-called separation of purpose (Shugart and 
Carey 1992, Cox and McCubbins 2001, Persson, Roland and Tabellini 2000).
9 
While the former is a well known vehicle for establishing a conflict of interests 
among different branches of government, it has been argued to be only a 
necessary, but not a sufficient condition for the creation of checks and balances. 
By allocating policymaking rights across different actors with different roles and 
capacities, the separation of powers should establish veto points and ensure that 
different interests are served. Still, if the purpose of separate powers is unified, 
the effective number of vetoes and the representation of different interests may 
be quite low (Cox and McCubbins 2001). 
Why and how do these aspects affect policymaking? It is argued that they 
together work to establish two key tradeoffs with respect to policy outcomes. 
The first is between the ability to implement policy change and achieve stability 
through commitment. Greater separation of powers and purpose make it harder 
to implement policy changes due to a greater number of veto points. This, 
however, should assure continuity and better ability to commit to established 
decisions, due to more intense cross-institutional conflict of interests. The 
second tradeoff is between the private and public-regardedness of the policy 
outcomes. Generally, the greater the number of vetoes, the more private-
regarding will be the policies enacted.  Namely, the bargaining takes place 
among more veto actors, and each is in the position to demand, and possibly 
receive, targeted policies in exchange for refraining from vetoing (Cox and 
McCubbins 2001).  
These two tradeoffs point to theoretical predictions relevant for this study. 
The first tradeoff – policy change vs. commitment – informs the expectations 
about the ‘flow’ outcomes. Regimes with weaker separation of power and 
purpose should have greater ability for (fiscal) policy change around elections. 
The second tradeoff establishes priors about the stock and composition of policy 
outcomes. Weaker conflict of interests should lead to more waste, inefficient 
spending, and pressures for higher taxation. This in turn may produce bigger 
governments. Fewer vetoes (higher unity of purpose) should lead to less private-
regardedness of fiscal policy, thus possibly leading to higher preference for 
public goods over targeted redistribution.  
                                                 
9 In addition to separation of power, Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) and Persson and 
Tabellini (2003) refer to what they call legislative cohesion, as a propensity of the members of the 
governing coalition to exhibit disciplined voting on policy issues.  This is very similar to the 
concept of separation of purpose, which is explained further in what follows.   Marko Klašnja 
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How do two broad regime categories
10 in theory compare on these 
aspects, and so, what would be the predictions about the respective fiscal 
outcomes? Presidential systems are characterized by separate (and direct) 
elections for both the executive (president) and the legislature (congress). In 
parliamentary systems, the executive (prime minister and its cabinet) is only 
indirectly formed though the legislature (the parliament). In theory, this should 
mean that presidential systems are endowed with conditions more auspicious for 
stronger separation of powers, if the constitutional arrangements are effective. 
The executive and the legislature are each separately accountable to the voters, 
and unable to bring the other down (except for constitutionally provided 
exceptional cases). In parliamentary systems, on the other hand, the executive 
derives its powers from a coalition in the legislature, the maintenance of which 
conditions the executive’s tenure.  
Persson, Roland and Tabellini (2000) argue that in a working democracy, 
greater separation of powers in presidential systems causes more intense 
legislative bargaining. This may bring about conditions for greater separation of 
purpose among the actors with policymaking powers. In presidential regime with 
a strong congress, robust proposal powers reside with the legislature alongside 
proactive and/or reactive competences of the president. Within the legislature, 
different policy dimensions are under the jurisdiction of different committees, 
and the coalition may change from policy issue to policy issue. Therefore, there 
may be a strong separation of purpose not just between the executive and the 
legislature, but within the latter as well. In parliamentary regimes, proposal 
powers typically reside within the ministries comprising the governing coalition. 
Given the possibility of no-confidence votes, calling of early elections and 
blockade or dissolution of the parliament, the need to preserve the coalition may 
bring about grater cohesion and unity of purpose than in presidential systems 
(Shugart and Haggard 2001).  
In theory, therefore, the priors about fiscal policy outcomes should be the 
following. Sharper conflict of interests in presidential systems should induce 
smaller governments, lower waste and taxation, and greater preference for 
targeted instruments. It should also reduce the likelihood of policy instability 
and change, and hence potentially the electoral cycles should be smaller, while 
the composition is tilted towards the provision of local goods.
11 And vice versa, 
fewer vetoes and more stable coalitions in parliamentary regimes should induce 
more waste and taxation, bigger governments, but also broader programs, in 
                                                 
10 Intermediate arrangements falling between the two poles are certainly numerous, but are 
abstracted from here for the sake of brevity and clarity.  More details are taken into account in the 
empirical section, as laid out below.   
11 Where cross-institutional conflict of interest is strong, it may be difficult to forge coalitions for 
creating new spending programs, especially those not benefiting specific veto actors.  Baldez and 
Carey (2001), for example, find evidence on this for Chile. Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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favor of a majority represented by a governing coalition. Greater unity of 
purpose should alleviate policy change, and thus perhaps lead to higher electoral 
cycles, especially in broad programs and consequently aggregate spending.   
Similar to electoral rules, there is a normative tradeoff between the two 
constitutional groups. Presidential systems generate lower provision of public 
goods and more redistribution to powerful minorities, but should assure greater 
policy stability and accountability. Parliamentary systems exhibit higher 
provision of public goods, but are expected to be less successful in dealing with 
the agency problem and policy volatility. Persson and Tabellini (2003, 2004) 
find moderate support for this for a cross-section of democracies, and in a panel 
for the previous four decades.   
These predictions are dependent on the assumption of an effective 
separation that is provided by the constitution. In practice, however, checks and 
balances may be present only nominally. Cox and McCubbins (2001) stress, and 
Streb, Lema and Torrens (2005) demonstrate that the actual outcomes depend on 
the  effective number of vetoes. Kunicova (2001), and Kucinova and Rose-
Ackerman (2005) point out that in most presidential systems, US-style checks 
and balances are absent, and presidents tend to have extensive legislative and 
non-legislative powers, often dictating the agenda in the legislature as well. 
Further, coalitions in the legislature may not be stable, the parliament may cater 
to fragmented constituencies, the cabinet may be dominated by few ministries, 
and may dominate the legislature, etc. Inherent degrees of separation of power 
and purpose are then not existent in reality, and the above predictions may not 
hold. These and other issues
12 are certainly relevant for the sample of transition 
countries examined here, as many of them do not have firm democratic 
institutions that ensure strong separation.  
Finally, there is another dimension by which forms of government matter 
for policy outcomes, similar to the impact of ballot structure presented above. It 
is the individual vs. collective nature of the executive (Persson and Tabellini 
2003). Attribution of and responsiveness to the performance of a policymaker 
should be stronger where the executive is (more) individualized, as is the case in 
presidential systems. This may give stronger incentives for policy cyclicity 
around elections in countries with presidentialism. Conversely, if collective 
nature of the executive blurs individual accountability and encourages wasteful 
spending and rents, one may observe greater cyclicity in parliamentary systems. 
The predictions about the strength of the cycles are therefore ambiguous. All of 
them are examined in the empirical section, which follows.  
                                                 
12 Many more factors have influence, such as the extent and nature of presidential powers, whether 
the legislature is bicameral or unicameral, and if the former, how the relationship between the 
houses is structured, the vertical organization of units of government such as federalism, if the 
executive’s term in office is fixed or not, if it can seek reelection, and so on.  Naturally, integrating 
some of these factors in the analysis is beyond the scope of this study.   Marko Klašnja 
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3  VARIABLES, DATA AND EMPIRICAL MODEL 
 
3.1  Variables 
Given the theoretical priors, we are interested both in aggregate fiscal variables 
and in the composition with respect to targetability of fiscal instruments. The 
variables therefore include total expenditures and revenues and the resulting 
overall balance on the one hand, and instruments grouped into social transfers 
and local public goods on the other. Social transfers cover broad items such as 
social assistance and unemployment insurance that benefit broad groups in the 
population. Following Milesi-Ferretti, Perotti and Rostagno (2005), local public 
goods include current purchases of goods and services, capital expenditures, and 
wages, as instruments that can be targeted to narrower groups, whether social or 
geographical. All measures are scaled to GDP and expressed as percentages. The 
data for balance, expenditures and fiscal instruments are taken from EBRD 
Economic Statistics database,
 13 complemented by IMF staff country reports. 
The data for central government revenue are taken from the IMF’s Government 
Finance Statistics and IMF staff country reports.  
To study the electoral behavior of fiscal policies around elections, we 
need a variable that will instrumentalize the election dates. In parliamentary 
systems, elections of the legislature and the executive coincide. In presidential 
systems the executive is separately elected, and in the sample the legislature is 
almost never elected in the same year.
14 Since electoral rules are theorized to 
have an effect primarily through legislative elections, while forms of 
government through executive elections, in presidential systems both types are 
used to construct the dummy variables ELECT and POST-ELECT.
15 In bicameral 
systems, the electoral rounds for the chambers may not coincide, producing the 
effectual mid-term elections. They are ignored, however, as we only focus on the 
lower house, in line with the established practice in this kind of research.
16 Also, 
a portion of chamber seats may be populated through actual mid-term 
elections.
17 The theoretical prior, however, is that the incentives created by these 
                                                 
13 http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/sei.xls, last accessed February 25, 2008.  
14 Only 9 legislative elections in presidential systems were held in the same year as the executive 
elections.   
15 A potential problem with this selection is that presidential systems (and given the constitutional 
split majoritarian systems) are more represented, and the estimates of the cyclicity therein may be 
biased upwards.  Estimations were therefore also performed only on a set of executive elections, 
and the results were mostly quite similar.  Results are available upon request.   
16 Lower houses are by and large constitutionally intended to be representative of the population, 
whereas upper houses may or may not be primarily guided by this principle.  The elections for the 
two are expected to be influenced accordingly.  Also, in parliamentary systems, only the lower 
house typically has veto powers.   
17 As in the case of the Czech Republic, where one third of the upper chamber (the Senate) is 
elected every second year.  Senators are elected for a six-year term, as opposed to the Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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elections are weaker than when the executive is elected in addition to the 
legislature (Persson and Tabellini 2003, Besley and Case 2003).
18 The data on 
election dates are taken from Armingeon and Careja (2004).
19  
Typically, the election dummy would take the value of 1 in the election 
year, and 0 otherwise. The post-elect dummy would thus have a value of 1 in the 
year after election. This, however, is a somewhat imprecise measure for 
elections that take place early in the calendar year, since the bulk of the 
prospective preelectoral manipulation will occur in the previous year, and of 
post-electoral manipulation in the election year. To account for this, ELECT takes 
the value of 1 in the year of election if it took place in the month of June or later. 
Otherwise, previous year is coded 1, to better capture the period of policy 
manipulation. In all remaining cases it takes the value of 0. Likewise, POST-
ELECT is actually coded 1 in the election year if the polling took place in the first 
half of the year. Otherwise, it takes the value of 1 for one-year lags of the 
election dates, and 0 in all other cases.  
If constitutional arrangements shape fiscal policy incentives, they need 
to be differentiated for empirical examination. The first aspect of electoral rules, 
the electoral formula, is broadly classified by means of an indicator variable 
MAJ. A country receives the value of 1 for MAJ if it predominantly relied on the 
plurality (or majority) electoral formula in the most recent election to the 
legislature (lower house). That is, MAJ equals 1 if more than half of the 
legislators were elected in any type of majority rule. Countries where all or the 
majority of members are elected on a proportional basis receive MAJ=0. The 
majority of countries in the sample combined the two broad categories.
20  
Section 2.1 outlines two other features by which a distinction is made 
between majoritarian and proportional systems – ballot structure and district 
magnitude.
 Three measures are developed to account for these aspects. First, 
following in principle Persson, Tabellini and Trebbi (2003), a variable BALLOT is 
created to measure the proportion of legislators in the lower house who are 
elected on an individual ballot by plurality rule. All members elected via party 
                                                                                                                          
representatives in the lower chamber (the Chamber of Deputies) who are elected for a term of four 
years.  
18 Another reason for excluding them is more practical: since the focus is on both preelectoral and 
post-electoral policy behavior, including mid-term elections would be too crowding, especially in 
presidential countries, where executive and legislative elections do not coincide. 
19 While the citation is for 2004 (as suggested by the authors), the dataset has been updated 
through 2006. See: 
http://www.ipw.unibe.ch/content/team/klaus_armingeon/comparative_political_data_sets/index_g
er.html  
20 Only Belarus, Kyrgyzstan, Uzbekistan, Macedonia and Ukraine until 1998 elections, had pure 
majoritarian systems.  On the other hand, Bulgaria, Croatia, Czech Republic, Estonia, Latvia, 
Moldova, Poland, Romania, Slovakia and Slovenia relied entirely on the proportional 
representation regime.   Marko Klašnja 
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lists or in multi-member constituencies are lumped together and coded as 0, 
irrespective of whether they are elected on open or closed lists. If all members 
are elected individually by a plurality rule, a country receives the value of 1. 
Any combination of the two yields the score in the [0,1] interval.
21 Second, to 
differentiate between open and closed list representation, a pair of mutually 
exclusive dummy variables OPEN and CLOSED was created, taking the value of 1 
if the lists are open/closed and the value of 0 otherwise. The data for these two 
measures were compiled from Armingeon and Careja (2004), and Beck et al. 
(2001). 
With regards to district magnitude, the basis for the measure is taken 
from Beck et al. (2001), where it is expressed as a weighted average, with the 
weight on each district magnitude in a country being the share of legislators 
running in districts of that size. To create the variable DISTRICT, the log of the 
original measure is taken, because increasing the district magnitude by one 
representative should have a very different effect on fiscal variables when the 
initial size is 1 than when it is 50. It is also inverted, so as to be scaled from 
larger to smaller districts, to make the interpretation consistent with the previous 
proxy, BALLOT.  Summary statistics for these two measures can be found in the 
lower panel of Table 2. 
What are the expected signs for electoral rule proxies? Given the theory 
outlined in 2.1, coefficients on MAJ=1 should be positive and higher (than for 
MAJ=0) on local public goods, either small or negative for transfers, and 
negative on revenues. Expectations are ambiguous about aggregate expenditures 
and balance. The same goes for DISTRICT. As for BALLOT, coefficients should be 
negative on transfers and revenues, and positive on local public goods. 
Expectations are ambiguous about expenditures and balance. Coefficients on 
CLOSED should be higher than on OPEN, and opposite from MAJ=1. These 
expectations are summarized in Panel A of Table 3. 
With respect to the forms of government, presidential systems (PRES=1) 
are those where the executive is elected directly, is not accountable to the 
legislature, and has either direct competences or holds ultimate veto power over 
budget formation and execution. The opposite goes for parliamentary regimes 
(PRES=0), where the executive (conducting fiscal policy) is accountable to the 
legislature, irrespective of whether or not there is a directly elected president, as 
in the case of Poland.
22 The information on these constitutional details were 
                                                 
21 For example, 75 out 131 MPs of the Armenian National Assembly are elected individually by a 
plurality rule.  The remaining 56 deputies are elected by the proportional system by lists from one 
multi-member constituency, comprising the entire territory of the Republic.  The score for 
Armenia, then, is 75/131=0.57 
22 The division of constitutional arrangements into presidential and parliamentary is certainly not 
too nuanced.  Many constitutions cannot easily be assigned to either of the models.  For example, 
Ukraine (after constitutional reforms of 2006) and Romania could rather be characterized as semi-Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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obtained from Armingeon and Careja (2004) and Berglund, Ekman and Aarebrot 
(2004).  
Given the theory from section 2.2, coefficients on aggregate spending 
and balance variables for PRES=1 may generally be smaller than for PRES=0, 
negative and stronger for taxes, positive on local public goods variable and 
either lower or negative on broad transfers (Panel B of Table 3).   
However, as noted above, the predictions crucially depend on the 
effective number of vetoes and therefore actual rather than nominal checks and 
balances. It is thus desirable to interact the PRES indicator with some measure of 
effective checks and balances. Following in principle Streb, Lema and Torrens 
(2005), the variable CHECKS is developed to approximate the level of discretion 
of the executive (over fiscal policy), and thus the actual separation of powers 
and purpose. Taken from Beck et al. (2001), the measure originally ranges from 
1 to 8 in an ascending order of effectiveness. It was chosen because it reflects 
both the conditions for legislative cohesion (degree of unity of purpose), and the 
actual competitiveness of the executive election and the level of political 
accountability (separation of powers). Namely, countries that do not have a 
competitive process in electing members of the legislature and the executive 
receive the lowest scores of 1 and 2. The score is incremented for (each chamber 
of) the legislature being controlled by the opposition, for open list PR, the 
number and orientation of parties comprising the governing coalition, collusion 
on economic policymaking, and the interplay between the distribution of seats 
and the electoral rules in place. The original measure is rescaled to a 0-7 range 
and divided by 7 in order to vary in the [0,1] interval. 
We are interested in the net effect of the effective number of checks and 
balances, given the conjecture that more veto players limit the ability for policy 
change (manipulation), and increase the private-regardedness of policy 
outcomes. It is therefore useful to isolate the discretional component of the 
electoral budget cycle by adjusting the original ELECT and POST-ELECT variables 
(variations of fiscal instruments before and after elections) by effective checks 
and balances (Streb, Lema and Torrens 2005):  
DISCRETIONARY ELECT=ELECT-ELECT*CHECKS=ELECT(1-CHECKS).  
This adjustment implies on one end that if separation of power and 
purpose are completely absent (CHECKS=0), we observe a pure discretional 
                                                                                                                          
presidential, with the former being president-parliamentary and the latter being premier-
presidential, depending on who holds the government accountable and who controls its formation 
(Shugart and Carey 1992).  Among parliamentary countries, the precise constitutional mechanisms 
for holding the executive accountable to the legislature vary considerably.  For example, in 
Hungary, the constructive role of no confidence is in place, meaning that the prime minister, 
elected by the parliament, can only be removed if its successor is elected simultaneously.  Still, 
these details are foregone due to focus of the study.  We are primarily concerned with who 
controls and executes fiscal policy, the details of which are taken into account in placing countries 
in either of the categories.   Marko Klašnja 
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electoral cycle in the policy instrument, which should intuitively be higher than 
if some checks are in place. On the other end, if the separation of powers and 
purpose are strong, the policy change is difficult, and we observe the absence of 
(CHECKS=1) or smaller electoral cycles. The prediction for the composition is 
more ambiguous, but it is suggested that the higher values of checks increase the 
taste for targeted instruments over broader transfers. Expectations for are 
presented in Panel B of Table 3.  Summary statistics for this measure are shown 
in the lower panel of Table 2.   
It is useful to note that in the period covered by the panel, the two binary 
classifications – MAJ and PRES – change seldom, suggesting that broad 
constitutional arrangements, adopted at the outset of transition, are inert and/or 
difficult to change.
23 Properly controlling for other factors, we should therefore 
be confident about their impact on fiscal policy outcomes.  
 
3.2  Control Variables 
When explaining the policies by panel estimation, fixed and year effects are 
always included to account for unobserved variation across countries and time. 
However, we try to explicitly control for as many relevant economic variables 
likely to shape fiscal outcomes. Following Brender and Drazen (2005), the 
vector of control variables includes proxies for the level of development, 
measured by the natural log of real per capita income, the fiscal pressure 
emanating from the demographic structure of a country, represented by the ratio 
of population aged 0-14 and over 60 to population 15-59 years old, and the 
impact of terms-of-trade shocks, measured as a share of international trade in 
GDP. Data for trade and per capita income are obtained from the World Bank’s 
World Development Indicators (WDI). Demographic data is from UNICEF’s 
TransMONEE database.
24 Since it is of interest to uncover electoral cycles, it is 
important to have a rich set of controls that capture the policy dynamics itself. 
Fiscal variables show certain inertia and path dependency, and so a lagged 
dependent variable is included on the right hand side. Also, following Persson 
and Tabellini (2003), to control for the fluctuations in fiscal policy induced by 
the business cycle and/or external shocks, a measure of output gap (GAP) is 
                                                 
23  PRES does not vary at all, although some shifting in competences is observed in Croatia, 
Georgia, Moldova, Romania, Slovakia, and Ukraine.  As for MAJ, Albania saw slight changes in 
the electoral regime in 1991, 1992, and again in 1997 and 2001; Macedonia went from a pure 
plurality to a mixed system in 1998, and under the brokerage of the international community, to a 
pure proportional system in 2001; Kyrgyzstan amended the electoral code in 1999, going from 
pure majoritarian system to having 25% of the lower house seats elected by proportional method, 
before reverting back to it in 2003; Ukraine switched from a pure majoritarian system to a mixed 
one in 1998; finally, Uzbekistan went from a uni- to a bicameral legislature in 2002.  These 
changes are reflected in BALLOT and DISTRICT.   
24 http://www.unicef-irc.org/databases/transmonee/2007/Tables_TransMONEE.xls,  last accessed 
February 25, 2008.  Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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included: the log difference between the change in real GDP and its country-
specific trend, computed using the Hodrick-Prescott filter.
25 Following Eslava 
(2005), a one period lag of general government debt is included to account for 
fiscal constraint in staging manipulation. Following Abed and Davoodi (2000), 
the share of agriculture in GDP, as a measure of hard-to-tax sectors, is also 
accounted for. Finally, privatization revenues are controlled for as a 
supplementary fiscal injection. Data for debt and privatization revenue are from 
EBRD, and for agriculture shares from the WDI.  Unless noted otherwise, all the 
covariates are included in all specifications.  More details are provided in 
footnotes to the tables.  
  
3.3  Sample 
The data comprises annual observations for 25 post-communist transition 
countries over the 1990-2006 period, data permitting. Since the dates of 
independence vary, the panel is inherently unbalanced. Serbia, Montenegro and 
Turkmenistan were excluded, the former due to problems of analytical 
consistency, the latter because there was only one instance of executive election 
in the reference time period. The sample totals 135 elections.  
There may be a substantive concern related to the nature of the elections 
in the sample. The assumption underlying the PBC argument is that the incentive 
for manipulation stems from uncertainty about reelection prospects. Most studies 
in the PBC orientation have therefore been performed on countries categorized 
in some way as democracies, so as to avoid the downward bias in the estimates 
by including countries where incentives for manipulation are removed or 
attenuated. However, Klasnja (2007) shows that “electoral year economics” is 
well present in this full sample of transition countries, and in the aggregate does 
not differ substantially from the sub-sample of countries with politically 
competitive elections.  
Another reason for maintaining the full sample has to do with the 
breakdown of institutional arrangements. Table 1 in Appendix shows the 
distribution of electoral rules and forms of government across transition 
countries. A combination of proportional representation and parliamentary 
system is most represented, followed by presidential systems with a majoritarian 
electoral formula. If a criterion is applied to eliminate countries without 
competitive elections, proportional-parliamentary regimes become 
overrepresented.
26 This may cause a bias in the estimates, and can aggravate the 
                                                 
25 Data permitting, the filter was applied for 1989-2006 period, so as to minimize the end-points 
problem.  “hprescott” command in STATA was used, with a smoothing parameter of 6.25.   
26 Applying the Polity IV-DPI filter from Klasnja (2007), 5 countries are entirely eliminated 
(Azerbaijan, Kazakhstan, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan and Uzbekistan), all of which have majoritarian-
presidential regimes.  The ratio of proportional representation to majoritarian electoral rules, and Marko Klašnja 
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general simultaneity problem stemming from the fact that the distribution of 
constitutional arrangements is not independent of the geographical, economic, 
social and historical factors not explicitly modeled (Table 2).  
 
3.4  Econometric Specification  
In what follows, parameter estimates are reported based on different versions of 
the following regression equation, built upon Persson and Tabellini (2003): 
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In the expression, Yi,t denotes a fiscal indicator in country i and year t. 
ELECTi,t and ELECTi,t+1 are the electoral dummy variables indicating the election 
in year t, and post-electoral period in year t+1, as defined in the previous section 
(ELECT AND POST-ELECT). Xi,t is the common vector of control variables. The 
lagged dependent variable Yi,t-1 and the shock measure GAPi,t are included based 
on the rationale laid out above. Country and year fixed effects, µi and λt, are 
included alongside the random error term, uit.  Si,t represents an indicator 
denoting different constitutional categories – MAJ and PRES, OPEN and CLOSED 
– therefore taking the value of 1 or 0. INT, if included, denotes the continuous 
measure capturing the finer institutional details – BALLOT, DISTRICT and CHECKS 
– as explained in the previous section. The main parameters of interest are 
values of δ and  η on the third line of the equation (3.1), which capture the 
effects of constitutions on fiscal variables, both before and after elections. 
Interaction terms between both MAJ and PRES, and OPEN and CLOSED, and the 
lagged dependent variable and the shock variable are included. This is important 
to avoid confounding different general policy dynamics with different cycles in 
different constitutional groups (Persson and Tabellini 2003). Interactions with 
MAJ and PRES are included in every specification; interaction terms with OPEN 
and CLOSED are included only when testing for finer details about electoral rules, 
in order to reduce the impact on degrees of freedom.
27  
Equation (3.1) is estimated using the fixed effects method. The presence 
of country specific and year specific intercepts renders the ordinary OLS 
                                                                                                                          
parliamentary to presidential governments then becomes 13:7 and 15:5, from 13:12 and 15:10 
respectively (Table 1).   
27 Alternatively, when estimating the impact of finer details for both electoral rules and forms of 
government, interaction terms with all binary and continuous constitutional variables (MAJ, PRES, 
OPEN, CLOSED, BALLOT, DISTRICT AND CHECKS) were included where appropriate.  The results were 
largely unchanged, however.    Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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estimator biased, due to the correlation of the random error and the unobserved 
effects. The fixed effects method eliminates this source of bias by differencing 
the original equation.
28 However, the bias caused by the inclusion of the lagged 
dependent variable – which makes (3.1) a dynamic panel model – remains. It is 
of order 1/T, where T is the length of the panel (Nickell 1981), and arises 
because the initial condition Yi,0 (when 0 ≠ ) is correlated with the error term. So, 
the magnitude of the bias in estimates depends on which sample and fiscal 
indicator is used. Since the maximum length of the panel is 17 years, and is often 
shorter, the bias problem may not be negligible. Alternatives used in the 
literature to avoid this problem are the methods utilizing the instrumental 
variable (IV) approach. Arellano and Bond (1991) developed a Generalized 
Method of Moments estimator that treats the model as a system of equations, 
one for each time period. The equations differ only in their instrument/moment 
condition sets.
29 Judson and Owen (1999) suggest that the GMM estimation as 
proposed by Arellano and Bond is more robust in the case of 20 ≤ T . Therefore, 
one-step and two-step variants of this method were also used to estimate each 
specification. Still, the GMM estimator is said to have poor finite sample 
properties, and its efficiency suffers when the width of the panel is small relative 
to the number of instruments (Wooldridge 2002).
30 So, only the results from 
conventional fixed effects estimations are reported.
31 For both methods, 
heteroscedasticity robust standard errors were computed.  
Another potential econometric problem is that the election dates may not 
be exogenous (Shi and Svensson 2002). This is less important in presidential 
                                                 
28 There is a concern over the model used to fit the panel data.  The alternative is the random-
effects (RE) model, which is based on the GLS estimator.  The choice between the two is typically 
made based on the Hausman specification test.  However, as argued by Wooldridge (2002), there 
is little theoretical justification for the use of RE when the underlying sample selection is markedly 
non-random, as is the case in this study (if we were drawing the countries from the global 
population, the theoretical justification would have been stronger).  In such cases, RE tends to be 
inconsistent.  We therefore opt for the FE estimator.  
29 Endogenous variables in first differences are instrumented with suitable lags of their own levels, 
since it is assumed that past realizations of the regressors are not correlated with the present errors.  
Strictly exogenous regressors are instrumented in a classical IV fashion. 
30 With 5 endogenous regressors (GDP, trade, privatization revenues, debt, and the share of 
agriculture), and additional interaction terms with constitutional indicators, the GMM computation 
yields a matrix containing over a 100 instruments.  Given that the maximum length of the panel is 
425, this is a sizable reduction in the degrees of freedom (as few as 65 in some specifications).  
Indeed, for the two-step estimator, the moment condition for overidentifying restrictions is by and 
large violated, suggesting that the bias is non-negligible.   
31 Results from GMM estimations are largely similar, with additional moment conditions upheld 
for the one-step estimations, if the Hansen test is used instead of the weakened (by the number of 
instruments) Sargan test of overidentifying restrictions.  Both statistics report tests of whether the 
instruments, as a group, appear exogenous.  For more details, see Roodman (2003).  The output is 
available from the author upon request.   Marko Klašnja 
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countries, where elections are typically held on a fixed schedule. Of greater 
concern are parliamentary systems, where election dates are sometimes not 
constitutionally fixed, but may rather reflect tactical choices of incumbents or 
government crises. Endogenous election dates may thus be correlated with the 
economic cycle: incumbent governments calling early elections when the 
economy is doing well, or government crises leading to new elections when it is 
doing badly. That may create upward (in the first case) or downward bias (in the 
second case) in the estimates of electoral cycles, since the policy variables are 
expressed as percentages of GDP. However, these prospective problems are 
addressed by the inclusion of the shock variable (GAPi,t) among the controls, 
both alone and interacted with the constitutional indicators. These variables and 
interaction terms should account for any regime-specific correlation between the 
dependent variable and the election date induced by the economic cycle.   
The next section reports the estimation results. First, electoral cycles are 
estimated for all countries unconditional of the constitutional arrangements 
(Table 4). Then, coefficients are reestimated based on the different aspects of 
electoral rules separately – electoral formulas (majoritarian vs. proportional – 
Table 5a), nomination and election procedure (open vs. closed lists within 
proportional representation regimes vs. majoritarian rules– Table5b), ballot 
structure (individual candidacies vs. party lists – Table 5c), and district 
magnitude (Table 5d) – and all lumped together (Table 6). Next, coefficients on 
election date indicators differ between different forms of government alone 
(presidential vs. parliamentary systems – Table 7), and finally interacted with 
effective checks and balances (Table 8).  
 
 
4  EMPIRICAL RESULTS  
 
4.1  Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
 
It is first necessary to establish whether there are cycles in fiscal policy around 
elections. Table 4 shows the results when electoral cycles are inspected 
unconditionally, i.e., irrespective of the constitutional arrangements. 
Preelectoral manipulation is pervasive. Balance deteriorates 
considerably before elections, and is driven mainly by the dynamics on the 
expenditure side. A drop of 1% of GDP in the year before election is a sizeable 
effect, considering the mean balance for the whole sample (-4.25%). Revenues 
appear to fall, although the results are not robust. Postelectoral year is mostly not 
characterized with measures to offset preelectoral expansion. From the F-test in 
the last row of the table, matching contraction is clearly ruled out for the overall 
balance, total expenditures and transfers. Taxes also continue to fall after Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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elections.
32 Therefore, one cannot conclude that in transition countries elections 
only cause a short-run displacement of fiscal resources. The rest of the analysis 




4.2  Electoral Rules and Political Budget Cycles 
 
4.2.1  Majoritarian/plurality rule vs. proportional representation 
 
Do the observed cycles differ between countries with different electoral rules? 
Table 5a presents results when fiscal variables are inspected conditional on the 
electoral formula. Considerable difference is observable primarily on the 
revenue side. Taxes are cut only in majoritarian systems, wherein post-election 
hikes are also absent, unlike under PR. This is broadly in line with the priors 
outlined above. The pre-post election variation in revenues is also significantly 
higher (and negative) in majoritarian than in PR systems, as shown by the F test 
in the last row of the table. On the spending side, overall expenditures seem to 
be higher under PR, as suggested by theory, although the difference is not 
statistically significant. It is therefore not surprising that results for overall 
balance are inconclusive.  
What is somewhat surprising however, are the findings for the 
composition effect. The stock priors predict that if anything, one should observe 
stronger cycles in broad transfers under PR than under plurality rules, and vice 
versa for targeted instruments. While for the latter the results are broadly 
expected, although statistically weak, for the former, they run counter to 
expectations. Transfers exhibit stronger expansion both before and after 
elections, and a statistically significant higher overall electoral variation in 
majoritarian rather than in proportional systems. What is puzzling is that this is 
not reflected in the aggregate spending measure, which is smaller than under PR 
(column 2). This suggests that the MAJ measure may be picking up the influence 
of another factor, either constitutional or unobserved. We therefore turn to other 
aspects of electoral rules. 
 
                                                 
32   In fact, revenue contraction is stronger in post-election years.  In addition, expansion of 
transfers also continues to be strong following the polling.  This is perhaps in part a consequence 
of the pressures on fiscal variables to accommodate the economic shocks stemming from 
transitional disequilibria, and may not be related to election calendar.  Moreover, many countries 
in the sample saw a drastic fall in revenue collection in the early stages of transition that was only 
gradually reversed following the tax reforms and subsiding inflation (see for example Gleich 
2003).   Marko Klašnja 
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4.2.2  Ballot Structure: Open vs. Closed List PR, and Individual Ballot vs. 
Party lists 
Panel B of Table 5 compares proportional representation with open-list ballots to 
that with closed lists (and the two to plurality systems). As predicted by theory, 
the attribution problem seems to induce more wasteful spending and pressures 
for higher taxation with closed-list PR rules. Overall balance is significantly 
worse than under open lists, which is primarily due to larger electoral variation 
in total expenditures. Also, tax hikes to finance the deteriorating balance after 
elections and postelectoral transfer spending are higher. Nonetheless, even the 
closed-list PR rule does not induce a stronger cycle in transfers than under 
majoritarian rules.  
Panel C further underscores the results from the previous two exercises. 
The signs for overall expenditures, revenues and targeted instruments are all in 
keeping with the theoretical priors. The coefficient on the latter now becomes 
statistically significant, suggesting the importance of the channel through which 
the ballot exerts influence – attribution of results and sensitivity of votes to 
performance. Namely, the more legislators are elected on an individual ballot, 
the higher the preference for targeted redistribution. The paradoxical result on 
the transfers, however, remains. It appears that individual ballots induce both 
higher targeted and higher broad-based spending programs, but this is again not 
reflected in the aggregate expenditure measure (column 2). This suggests either 
that spending is cut in categories other than local public goods and broad-based 
measures (such as capital expenditures, interest payments, etc.), or that 
something else may be driving the transfers but is picked up by MAJ and BALLOT 
indicators.  
 
4.2.3  District Magnitude 
Panel D of Table 6 shows the results when cycles are examined conditioned on 
the district magnitude. Since the variable is logged, taking the exponents of the 
coefficients gives values closer in magnitude to those from previous tables. 
District magnitude primarily influences revenue policies. The smaller the size of 
the district, the higher are the tax cuts around elections. While other coefficients 
generally have predicted signs, the impact is not statistically significant.  
 
4.2.4  Electoral Formula, Ballot Structure and District Magnitude 
Any one dimension of electoral rules likely exerts influence in concert with the 
others, as they are constitutionally related. Therefore, it is worthwhile examining 
their influence together, as a check on whether the results on their co-influence 
on fiscal policy outcomes remain in line with the priors and with the results on 
their individual impact.  
We combine the MAJ, BALLOT and OPEN/CLOSED indicators into one 
composite measure, and include the district magnitude variable alongside. The Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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composite variable tracks the BALLOT for the proportion of legislators elected on 
individual ballots by plurality rule. However, it also receives the value of 1 if the 
closed-list system is used, provided that there is a portion of legislators elected 
on party lists. Also, it receives a score no lower than 0.5 if the country scores 1 
on the MAJ variable. In other words, a country receives the value of 1 if all the 
legislators are elected on individual ballot by majority voting, or have more than 
half of the legislators elected by plurality rule and the remaining legislators 
through closed-list PR. On the other hand, it receives a score of 0 only if all the 
legislators are elected on party lists through open-list PR. The values in between 
are based on the BALLOT variable. This means that moving from 0 to 1 indicates 
a move towards a more majoritarian system, individual ballot structure, and 
closed-list rule for PR.  
Combining all the features together is expected to yield statistically 
stronger results, as the model captures richer dynamics. This is indeed what we 
observe in Table 6. More importantly, the signs and magnitudes remain 
consistent. Relying on closed-list PR and/or predominantly electing legislators 
on individual ballot aggravates cycles in overall balance, expenditures, and in 
broad transfers. The nature of the composite measure, however, does not allow 
us to attribute the effects to particular features. Nevertheless, given the 
consistency in results, it is likely that individual channels captured in previous 
panels paint the right picture: closed PR increases preelectoral manipulation in 
expenditures and balance, individual ballots cause higher variation in local 
public goods and possibly in broad transfers. The effect on taxes is primarily 
through district magnitude: taxes are cut more in systems with smaller districts, 
possibly to satisfy preferences of the majority for lower taxation.  
Normatively, therefore, opting for closed-list PR, or for predominantly 
majoritarian system with small districts yield suboptimal policy outcomes 
around elections. Smaller cycles and less waste are observed in systems with 
open lists and a more balanced combination of PR and plurality rule, with 
districts of larger average size.  Majoritarian systems are not associated with 
greater accountability through fiscal discipline. Proportional systems do not 
appear to induce greater representativeness through redistribution towards 
majority than majoritarian regimes.  
 
 
4.3  Forms of Government 
4.3.1  Nominal Checks and Balances 
Do cycles differ between transition countries with different forms of 
governments? Table 7 shows the basic results, when constitutionally implied 
separation of power and purpose are taken at face value. The most striking result 
is that for broad transfers. Once again, it defies the priors. Greater separation of Marko Klašnja 
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powers should reduce the executive’s and the legislators’ interest in providing 
public goods at the national level. Also, greater separation of purpose should 
ensure a more private-regarding content of policy outcomes. The latter is 
somewhat reflected in the results: electoral cycles in targeted instruments 
(column 5) are significantly higher in countries with presidentialism. But they 
also exhibit significantly higher pre- and postelectoral expansions of broad 
transfers. The effect is so strong, that we suspect it is responsible for the similar 
finding under alternative electoral rules, given that most presidential countries at 
the same time have majoritarian rules (see Table 1).
33 Further, parliamentary 
regimes tend to have smaller preelectoral tax cuts and show postelectoral hikes, 
unlike presidential regimes. Performance does not differ significantly for overall 
balance and expenditures, although the latter expand slightly more strongly in 
parliamentary systems.  
Overall, the cycles seem to be stronger in presidential systems. This may 
reflect that voters are more sensitive to performance of an individualized 
executive, inducing presidents to exaggerate fiscal outcomes around elections. 
However, this still leaves the puzzling compositional effect unexplained. The 
result may also suggest that vetoes inhibiting cycle-like policy changes are less 
effective in presidential countries in transition. To test this supposition, we turn 
to examining discretionary cycles in either constitutional group.  
 
4.3.2  Effective Checks and Balances 
Table 8 shows the results when the procedure explained in section 3.1 is applied. 
It reveals the discretionary component of the observed cycles, i.e. the size of the 
cycle given the effective structure of vetoes and checks and balances.  
The results are normatively revealing: constitutionally implied checks 
and balances in presidential transition countries are not functional. Indeed, 
average discretion is higher in presidential (CHECKS are lower, 0.18) than in 
parliamentary regimes (CHECKS=0.38; see Table 2), and this is reflected in 
policy outcomes. Ineffective vetoes, in combination with greater responsiveness 
of individualized executive, lead to expansion in both broad transfers and local 
public goods, whereas this is not the case in parliamentary regimes. Further, 
while with ineffective checks we observe the appearance of preelectoral tax cuts 
                                                 
33 Indeed, pairwise correlation coefficient between MAJ and PRES, or BALLOT and PRES, is 0.6 and 
0.72 respectively, and significant at 1% level.  It may be advisable to examine a “four-way 
constitutional split” (Persson and Tabellini 2003), since there are four countries in the sample that 
do not have a majoritarian-presidential or proportional-parliamentary systems.  In this way, one 
would avoid the bias that arises if the left-out constitutional feature, for example the form of 
government, differs across the included feature, say the electoral rule.  The problem is that there is 
only one case of proportional-presidential system – that of Russia, which renders the four-way 
split statistically untenable.  Nevertheless, the calculations were made excluding Russia.  The 
results remained mainly the same for the two predominant constitutional combinations.    Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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even in parliamentary countries, the revenue cycle is much more adverse in 
presidential systems.  
The normative tradeoff between the two groups thus disappears. 
Presidentialism in transition countries does not deal with the agency problem 
better, as the theory suggests, since there is more fiscal wastefulness around 
elections. Ineffectiveness of veto points also makes the overall policy less stable. 
Responsiveness of voters to individual performance induces presidents to cater 
for pockets of important minorities. But, the lack of institutional restraints 
(higher unity of purpose) also allows for populist measures on a national level 
not only through tax cuts, but also through the expansion of transfers.  
 
 
5  CONCLUSIONS 
 
This study has attempted to find answers to several relevant questions about 
fiscal policymaking in transition countries by means of a comprehensive 
empirical survey. First, upon identifying the fiscal cycles around elections in 
transition countries (Table 4), it set out to inspect whether there are systematic 
differences in these cycles between countries with different electoral rules and 
forms of government. The differences do exist, primarily on the revenue side, 
and in the composition of expenditures. Taxes are cut and targeted outlays are 
expanded before elections only in countries with majoritarian rules and 
presidential governments. Also, revenues are consolidated after elections only in 
countries with proportional regimes and parliamentary systems. These findings 
are markedly different from Persson and Tabellini (2003), suggesting that 
transition has induced outcomes different from democracies examined therein, 
bringing us to the second substantive question of the paper. 
Namely, existing theories have established a number of predictions with 
regards to fiscal outcomes under these alternative constitutional arrangements. 
But, they have focused on what have been termed the ‘stock’ outcomes, namely, 
persistent differences over a longer period of time, stemming from long-standing 
constitutional arrangements and entrenched fiscal preferences of the populations 
in such polities. These predictions, however, may be less useful for transition 
countries, where constitutions and fiscal preferences have undergone changes in 
the post-Communist period. Focusing on ‘flows’, i.e. outcomes around elections, 
this paper asked to what extent do empirical results conform to ‘stock’ 
predictions.  The findings are mixed. Priors are generally supported for revenues 
and targeted instruments. At present, one cannot draw clear conclusions for 
overall balance and total expenditures. However, predictions are clearly astray 
for broad transfers, where we find proportional systems to be less proportional 
and presidential systems to be less redistributive than theorized. This may be 
caused by a confluence of factors, most prominent of which appears to be the Marko Klašnja 
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ineffectiveness of checks and balances in transition countries with 
presidentialism. This leads us to the third question posed by the article.  
Existing theories discussed the normative implications of alternative 
constitutional designs on fiscal policymaking.  In working democracies, a 
tradeoff obtains, making it difficult to designate one broad set of electoral rules 
or forms of government better than the other. The paper attempted to examine 
whether such conclusions are upheld in the case of transition countries. The 
answer seems to be fairly clear for the choice of the government system, and is 
in the negative. Constitutionally intended separation of power and purpose is 
much less effective in presidential countries than in parliamentary ones, resulting 
in more wastefulness, less accountability, and negative externalities in 
composition of fiscal outcomes around elections. The tradeoff between 
presidentialism and parliamentary democracy therefore seems to be removed for 
countries in transition. Since most presidential countries also predominantly rely 
on majoritarian rules, conclusions are harder to draw for electoral rules.  
Where do we go from here? A number of questions arise. It was beyond 
this study to examine what potential aspects of the transition process have 
induced differences from the results obtained for non-transition countries. For 
example, why are strong cycles in broad transfers registered in majoritarian and 
presidential systems, contrary to theoretical expectations? If they take place 
concurrently with expansions in targeted instruments but this is not reflected in 
overall expenditures, where do the offsetting cuts take place? Further, it would 
be interesting and useful to examine how – if at all – these flow outcomes are 
shaping the stock differences between constitutional groups. Moreover, it would 
be useful to examine what factors caused the breakdown of the normative fiscal 
tradeoff between presidentialism and parliamentarianism. How to make the 
checks and balances on (fiscal) policymaking more effective in countries with 
presidential governments? These and other questions should be addressed 
theoretically as well as empirically.  
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Presidential Sd Parliamentary Sd
p(Ha:mean 
diff=0)
Balance -4.883 5.9 -2.582 3.3 0 -3.722 4.5 -3.445 3.8 0.53
Total Expenditure 33.03 11.3 41.659 6.4 0 30.687 10.2 41.412 7.2 0
Total Revenue 23.777 8.1 27.751 9.5 0 22.559 8.9 36.744 8.0 0
Social Transfers 8.398 4.8 13.871 3.6 0 7.046 4.4 13.551 4.0 0
Local Public Goods 17.643 6.3 22.508 7.2 0 15.959 6.9 21.992 6.7 0
Real per capita GDP(log) 6.811 0.9 7.858 0.8 0 6.438 0.7 7.951 0.6 0
Trade/GDP 91.475 29.9 102.635 33.0 0 90.81 29.9 100.888 32.8 0
Population over 60 (%) 13.152 5.2 17.92 2.5 0 12.637 5.1 17.666 3.2 0
Agriculture (% of GDP) 21.286 13.1 11.139 9.4 0 19.485 11.3 13.558 12.4 0
Transition Indicator
2
2.301 0.6 2.747 0.6 0 2.235 0.5 2.787 0.7 0
Ballot Structure
3 0.720 0.2 0.037 0.1 0 0.736 0.2 0.160 0.3 0
District Magnitude (Log)
4 3.860 1.4 2.087 1.2 0 3.605 2.0 2.555 1.2 0
Checks and Balances
5 0.194 0.2 0.409 0.2 0 0.184 0.2 0.378 0.2 0  
Notes: Mean values by constitutional groups; p(Ha:mean diff=0) is the probability of 
rejecting the null hypothesis that the means across constitutional groups are equal; 
1 Sd = 
Standard Deviation; 
2 Average score on the EBRD Transition Indicators, denoting 
progress in reforms (see: http://www.ebrd.com/country/sector/econo/stats/timeth.htm); 
3 
Proportion of legislators in the lower house who are elected on an individual ballot by 
plurality rule (see section 3.1);  
4  Number of representatives elected by each 
constituency size, weighted (see section 3.1); 
5 Level of discretion of the executive over 
fiscal policy (see section 3.1) 
 











Maj=1 - + - -/0 +
Maj=0 - + + + -/0
Ballot ??- - +
Open -- + > + -
Closed -> +> + +> -
District ??- - / 0 +
Pres =1 - + -> -/0 +
Pres =0 - + - + -/0
Checks + - + ? (-) ? (+)
Panel A: Electoral Rules
Panel B: Forms of Government
 
Notes: -(+)> negative (positive) and higher than respective opposite category; -(+)/0 
negative (positive) or neutral; ? ambiguous priors 
 Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
 
Table 4. Unconditional Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 










Elect -1.053*** 0.819** -0.307 0.630*** 0.161
[0.30] [0.35] [0.39] [0.20] [0.26]
Post-Elect 0.0342 -0.013 -0.538 0.452** -0.128
[0.31] [0.35] [0.44] [0.20] [0.27]
Observations 263 251 263 234 190
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.532 0.326 0.515 0.473
F-test 7.989 21.65 13.63 8.126 10.55
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F: Elect=-Post-Elect 4.40** 2.66* 1.5 11.05*** 0.03  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets (absolute values) 
Covariates include: log of real per capita GDP, population dependency ratio, 
international trade (% of GDP), lag of general government debt, privatization revenues 
(% of GDP), share of agriculture (% of GDP), lag of the dependent variable, alone and 
interacted with MAJ and PRES, and the log difference between real GDP and its (country-
specific) trend, alone and interacted with MAJ and PRES. Country and year-fixed effects 
included.  
1 F-test of the null hypothesis that all country specific effects are equal 
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Table 5. Electoral Formula, Ballot Structure, District Magnitude, and Political 
Budget Cycles 











Elect*Majoritarian System -0.783** 0.444 -0.935 0.850*** 0.307
[0.39] [0.47] [0.67] [0.26] [0.40]
Post-Elect*Majoritarian System -0.164 -0.0902 -1.339* 0.719** -0.264
[0.41] [0.48] [0.74] [0.29] [0.38]
Elect*Proportional System -1.310*** 1.197** 0.431 0.349 0.0419
[0.46] [0.49] [0.39] [0.29] [0.34]
Post-Elect*Proportional System 0.206 0.0987 0.396 0.113 -0.0185
[0.46] [0.48] [0.42] [0.25] [0.40]
Observations 263 251 263 234 190
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.43 0.531 0.34 0.519 0.469
F-test 7.373 19.8 12.46 7.741 9.824
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F: Elect*Maj=Elect*(1-Maj) 0.78 1.26 2.96* 1.67 0.26
F: PostElect*Maj=PostElect*(1-Maj) 0.36 0.08 4.00** 2.53 0.20
F: Elect*Maj+PostElect*Maj=Elect*(1-
Maj)+PostElect*(1-Maj)
0.03 0.75 5.54** 2.93* 0.01
Elect*Closed List PR -1.950*** 1.724** 0.103 0.492 -0.131
[0.56] [0.70] [0.57] [0.31] [0.54]
Post-Elect*Closed List PR 0.257 0.545 1.072* 0.555 0.0774
[0.55] [0.65] [0.56] [0.34] [0.64]
Elect*Open List PR -0.643 0.552 0.468 0.0744 0.0152
[0.61] [0.52] [0.56] [0.51] [0.47]
Post-Elect*Open List PR -0.305 -0.142 0.139 -0.306 -0.265
[0.64] [0.57] [0.62] [0.38] [0.54]
Elect*Majoritarian System -0.45 0.238 -0.823 0.797*** 0.349
[0.41] [0.51] [0.69] [0.27] [0.42]
Post-Elect*Majoritarian System -0.307 -0.0318 -1.298* 0.674** -0.212
[0.43] [0.54] [0.77] [0.29] [0.42]
Observations 262 250 262 233 189
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.45 0.542 0.367 0.532 0.445
F-test 7.144 18.22 9.595 7.655 8.44
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F: Elect*Closed=Elect*Open 2.77* 1.66 0.2 0.43 0.04




0.27 1.48 0.17 1.58 0.02
Panel B: Open/Closed PR vs. Majoritarian/Plurality
Panel A: Electoral Formula: Majoritarian vs. Proportional Rules
 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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Table 5. Continued 











Elect*Ballot Structure 0.87 -1.239 -1.051 0.912* 0.799*
[0.82] [0.87] [1.36] [0.53] [0.31]
Post-Elect*Ballot Structure -0.49 -0.372 -3.000* 0.829 -0.519
[0.78] [0.96] [1.58] [0.54] [0.78]
Observations 262 250 262 233 189
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.442 0.557 0.382 0.533 0.464
F-test 7.13 23.43 10.92 9.04 8.582
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Elect*District Magnitude 0.0501 0.0286 -0.236* -0.0537 0.00318
[0.19] [0.23] [0.12] [0.15] [0.18]
Post-Elect*District Magnitude 0.0561 -0.21 -0.509*** 0.0735 -0.189
[0.21] [0.23] [0.17] [0.15] [0.19]
Observations 244 234 244 217 181
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.455 0.553 0.561 0.522 0.463
F-test 7.218 20.31 10.57 7.224 7.676
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Panel C: Ballot Structure: Indivdual-Plurality vs. Party-Lists PR
Panel D: District Magnitude
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets (absolute values) 
Covariates include: log of real per capita GDP, population dependency ratio, international trade (% 
of GDP), lag of general government debt, privatization revenues (% of GDP), share of agriculture 
(% of GDP), lag of the dependent variable, alone and interacted with MAJ and PRES, and OPEN and 
CLOSED, and the log difference between real GDP and its (country-specific) trend, alone and 
interacted with MAJ and PRES, OPEN and CLOSED. Election dates indicators ELECT and POSTELECT 
are included but not reported in Panels C and D, and excluded in Panels A and B. Country and 
year-fixed effects included.  Marko Klašnja 
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Table 6. Electoral Rules and Political Budget Cycles 











Elect*Maj-Ballot-Closed/Open List -1.822** 1.072 -0.519 1.058* 0.59
[0.87] [0.89] [0.20] [0.48] [0.77]
Post-Elect*Maj-Ballot-Closed/Open List -0.482 0.3 -0.0844 1.395** 0.101
[0.84] [0.94] [0.76] [0.58] [0.85]
Elect*District Magnitude 0.0697 0.0332 -0.234* -0.0747 -0.0111
[0.19] [0.24] [0.12] [0.14] [0.18]
Post-Elect*District Magnitude 0.101 -0.218 -0.457*** 0.0687 -0.13
[0.20] [0.24] [0.17] [0.14] [0.20]
Observations 244 234 244 217 181
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.468 0.55 0.566 0.555 0.464
F-test 7.763 19.16 9.241 6.522 7.466
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00  
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets (absolute values) 
Covariates include: log of real per capita GDP, population dependency ratio, 
international trade (% of GDP), lag of general government debt, privatization revenues 
(% of GDP), share of agriculture (% of GDP), lag of the dependent variable, alone and 
interacted with MAJ and PRES, and OPEN and CLOSED, and the log difference between 
real GDP and its (country-specific) trend, alone and interacted with MAJ and PRES, OPEN 
and  CLOSED.  Election dates indicators ELECT and POSTELECT are included but not 
reported. Country and year-fixed effects included.  Electoral Rules, Forms of Government, and Political Budget Cycles in Transition Countries 
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Table 7. Forms of Government and Political Budget Cycles 











Elect*Presidential System -0.948* 0.576 -0.471 1.055*** 0.769
[0.49] [0.56] [0.81] [0.32] [0.53]
Post-Elect*Presidential System -0.0843 0.0254 -1.761* 1.129*** -0.375
[0.49] [0.58] [0.92] [0.38] [0.50]
Elect*Parliamentary System -1.121*** 0.978** -0.111 0.305 -0.0964
[0.40] [0.44] [0.37] [0.23] [0.30]
Post-Elect*Parliamentary System 0.106 -0.0223 0.293 -0.034 -0.0824
[0.41] [0.43] [0.40] [0.21] [0.34]
Observations 263 251 263 234 190
Number of Countries 25 25 25 25 20
Adjusted R-squared 0.426 0.529 0.34 0.539 0.477
F-test 7.653 19.77 12.9 8.727 9.696
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F: Elect*Pres=Elect*(1-Pres) 0.07 0.32 0.16 3.69* 2.67*
F: PostElect*Pres=PostElect*(1-Pres) 0.09 0.01 3.91** 7.20*** 0.22
F: Elect*Pres+PostElect*Pres=Elect*(1-
Pres)+PostElect*(1-Pres)
0.01 0.09 2.69* 7.94*** 0.41
 
* significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets (absolute values) 
Covariates include: log of real per capita GDP, population dependency ratio, 
international trade (% of GDP), lag of general government debt, privatization revenues 
(% of GDP), share of agriculture (% of GDP), lag of the dependent variable, alone and 
interacted with MAJ and PRES, and the log difference between real GDP and its (country-
specific) trend, alone and interacted with MAJ and PRES. Country and year-fixed effects 
included.  Marko Klašnja 
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Table 8. Effective Checks and Balances, Forms of Government, and Political 
Budget Cycles 










Elect*Discretionary President -0.987 1.192* -0.62 1.468*** 1.001*
[0.60] [0.67] [1.11] [0.39] [0.60]
Post-Elect*Discretionary President -0.216 -0.0967 -2.313 1.162** -0.25
[0.62] [0.71] [1.43] [0.45] [0.57]
Elect*Discretionary Parliament -1.845*** 1.173 -0.348 0.663* -0.572
[0.68] [0.71] [0.60] [0.35] [0.47]
Post-Elect*Discretionary Parliament 0.37 -0.375 0.778 -0.237 -0.472
[0.70] [0.69] [0.65] [0.35] [0.53]
Observations 247 237 247 221 177
Number of Countries 24 24 24 24 19
Adjusted R-squared 0.441 0.526 0.352 0.543 0.444
F-test 7.546 26.5 10.98 8.891 8.214
Prob>F 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
F: Elect*PresC=Elect*(1-Pres)C 0.85 0.01 0.05 2.74* 4.59**
F: PostElect*PresC=PostElect*(1-Pres)C 0.41 0.08 3.71** 5.88** 0.07
F: Elect*PresC+PostElect*PresC=Elect*(1-
PresC)+PostElect*(1-PresC)
0.04 0.04 2.12 5.96** 2.57*
 
 * significant at 10%; ** significant at 5%; *** significant at 1% 
Heteroscedasticity robust standard errors in brackets (absolute values) 
Covariates include: log of real per capita GDP, population dependency ratio, 
international trade (% of GDP), lag of general government debt, privatization revenues 
(% of GDP), share of agriculture (% of GDP), lag of the dependent variable, alone and 
interacted with MAJ and PRES, and the log difference between real GDP and its (country-
specific) trend, alone and interacted with MAJ and PRES. Country and year-fixed effects 
included.  
  